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Mahoney: The “Legal Stranger” and Parent

THE “LEGAL STRANGER” AND PARENT:
A LOVE STORY?
Kellie Mahoney*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Dealing with a divorce or legal separation is overwhelming for
all couples. 1 Married same-sex couples who walk the same path,
however, find an incredibly different road ahead of them, especially
when it comes to issues of custody and visitation. 2 These matters are
further complicated if there is only one legal or biological parent. 3
Traditionally, a “parent” is defined as “an individual who is the
biological parent, stepparent or adoptive parent of a child whose
guardianship and custody or care and custody have been transferred by
the parent to an authorized agency . . . .” 4 However, most jurisdictions,
including New York, have moved away from this strict interpretation
of what a parent is. 5 Many States have adopted the definition provided
by the American Law Institute (ALI) 6 and expanded their idea of a
*Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D., 2018; Stony Brook, B.A., in Political
Science, 2015. I would like to thank the other two thirds of the musketeers and my teammate
– endless thanks and love for the support, encouragement and patience throughout this process.
Finally, I would like to give a special thank you to Dean Myra Berman, my faculty advisor,
for always being there with words of encouragement, and to my editor, Rhona Amorado, for
her assistance and advice.
1 Diane Neumann, The Psychological Stages of Divorce, DIANE NEUMANN & ASSOCIATES,
(2011), http://www.divorcemed.com/Articles/ArticlesByDiane/The%20Psychological%20 St
ages%20of%20Divorce.htm.
2 Julie Compton, For Some Same-Sex Couples, Divorce is a Legal Nightmare, NBC NEWS,
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/some-same-sex-couples-divorcelegal-nightmare-n643891.
3 Id.
4 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 422.1 (2015).
5 Joel Stashenko, Ruling Expands NY Definition of Parenthood, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL,
Aug. 30, 2016.
6 The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the country
producing work “to clarify, modernize, and improve the law.” THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
ABOUT ALI, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ (2017). ALI is responsible for drafting, revising
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parent to include the concepts of psychological parent, de facto parent
and parent by estoppel. 7
To establish a psychological parent, the party seeking custody
or visitation must meet three general requirements. 8 The party: (i)
cannot be the legal parent; (ii) must have resided with the child for a
significant period of time; and (iii) must have performed a certain level
of caretaking functions. 9 ALI defines a de facto parent as a party, other
than a legal or biological parent who lived with the child for a requisite
period of time and, with the consent, of the legal parent, forms a parentchild relationship, or regularly performed a certain share of caretaking
duties without any compensation or expectation thereof. 10 A parent by
estoppel is defined as an individual who is either obligated to pay child
support or lived with the subject child for a certain period of time and
made good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities of child care, or lived
with the child since birth and accepted responsibility for the child. 11
While some of these definitions are recognized in New York, they have
not been held to apply to same-sex couples when determining custody
and visitation during a divorce. 12
In 1991, the Court of Appeals in the state of New York decided,
in Alison D. v. Virginia M., 13 that the notion of parents were a man and
a woman; 14 same-sex couples did not fall into this category. 15 As a
result of Alison D., the non-biological or non-adoptive partner in a
same-sex couple was not granted the same rights as a biological or
legal parent when seeking custody and/or visitation. 16 After more than
twenty years, the Court of Appeals decided, in In the Matter of Brooke

and publishing Restatements of the Law, Model Codes, and Principles of Law that are
foundational in both courts and legislatures, as well as being crucial to legal education.
7 Id.
8 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 18, (The Free Press, 2nd ed. 1979); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 18 (American Law
Institute, 1st softcover ed. 2003).
9 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 18.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See discussion infra Sections IV, V and VI.
13 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991).
14 Stashenko, supra note 5.
15 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27. This changed when the highest court in New York decided
Brooke. In the Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 490 (N.Y. 2016).
16 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27.
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S.B. v. Elizabeth A. C. C., 17 that Alison D. no longer applied. 18 In
August 2016, the Court of Appeals held “that where a partner shows
by clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a
child and to raise the child together, the non-biological, non-adoptive
partner has standing to seek visitation and custody under Domestic
Relations Law (DRL) § 70.” 19 While this may be a step in the right
direction, there are still certain limitations placed upon who has
standing to seek custody or visitation. 20 Under Brooke, a couple must
have a preconception agreement in order for the non-biological, nonlegal parent to have standing to seek custody or visitation. 21 As such,
there is still a large group of couples who will not meet this criteria.
It is the argument of this Note that the definition of parent
should be expanded beyond a legal or biological parent, requiring the
State to also recognize the type of parentage illustrated by the ALI
principles, namely, psychological parent, de facto parent, and parent
by estoppel. Expanding the legal definition of a parent would allow
formerly married same-sex partners to establish standing to seek
custody and visitation in the State of New York.
This Note will be divided into four sections. Section II will
look at the New York Court of Appeals and its decisions regarding the
status of homosexuals and the protections, or lack thereof, afforded to
them and their families by the Court. Specifically, it will discuss the
Court’s strict interpretation of the DRL in Alison D., the context that
gave rise to that decision, and how courts handled Alison D. going
forward. Section III will discuss the evolution of the definition of
marriage ranging from the Defense of Marriage Act to two Supreme
Court cases, the most recent of which was Obergefell v. Hodges, 22
decided in 2015. Section IV will discuss, in detail, the three concepts
of parent followed by the ALI. Specifically, this section will discuss
the concept of the psychological parent, de facto parent, and parent by

17

Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 490.
Id.
19 Id. (citing to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §70 (McKinney 2018)).
20 See generally Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 490.
21 Id.
22 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015). This case will be discussed at length
in Section III as it is the beginning of same-sex relationship recognition throughout the legal
system. As this Note is discussing married same-sex partners, a discussion of Obergefell is
necessary to give a complete picture of same-sex couples in the legal system.
18
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estoppel, its application in other jurisdictions, 23 and how New York
courts have handled these concepts as it applies to same sex couples.
Furthermore, this section explains the concept of a parent by estoppel
in relation to the New York Court of Appeals 2016 landmark decision,
Brooke, which overruled Alison D. Section V will make the argument
as to how New York should move forward in light of the decision in
Brooke, as well as the concepts discussed in the previous sections.
Finally, section VI will put forth the proposition that New York should
extend the definition of parent to include the principles set forth above.
II.

ALISON D. V. VIRGINIA M. AND HER LEGACY

Alison D. v. Virginia M. did not arise out of a vacuum, but
followed a line of cases from the New York Court of Appeals that
limited or refused to acknowledge same-sex couples and their
freedoms. 24 The two major cases, People v. Onofre 25 and In re
Adoption of Robert Paul P., 26 show the beginnings of those limitations
and how the Court reached its decision in Alison D.
A. Alison D.’s Predecessors
In 1980, the Court of Appeals decided People v. Onofre. 27
Defendant Onofre was convicted by the trial court of violating §
130.38 of the Penal Law “after his admission to having committed acts
of deviate sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old male at [his] home.”28
The Court held New York’s sodomy laws were unconstitutional
because it distinguished between married and unmarried persons as
well as heterosexual and homosexual conduct. 29 The Court found that
such classifications were unconstitutional under the Equal Protection

23 In showcasing what this could look like, this Note will focus its examples solely on those
in the Northeastern states.
24 See generally In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 63 N.Y.2d 233, 235 (N.Y. 1984), People
v. Onofre 51 N.Y.2d 476, 483 (N.Y. 1980).
25 Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476.
26 Adoption of Robert, 63 N.Y.2d 233; see also Joseph G. Arsenault, Comment: “Family”
but Not “Parent”: The Same-Sex Coupling Jurisprudence of the New York Court of Appeals,
58 ALB. L. REV. 813, 829 (1995).
27 Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right of privacy granted
by the Constitution. 30
In an attempt to gain further protection under the laws of the
United States, unmarried same-sex couples tried to find a foothold to
legitimize their relationships. 31 In the case of In re Adoption of Robert
Paul P., a man tried to adopt his partner for financial, economic, and
emotional reasons. 32 The Court found this invalid, but in hearing the
case, recognized the need for same-sex partners to have security and
stability in their personal affairs. 33 Nevertheless, the Court again
refused to extend to same-sex partners the same rights and protections
of the law granted to heterosexual couples. 34 This case was known as
a critical low-point for homosexual couples. 35
While these cases did not make great strides for same-sex
couples and the homosexual community, it opened the Court’s eyes to
the fact that there is a whole other group of people, with lives and
homes, and joint bank accounts that were looking for protection and
legitimacy under the law. 36 Despite the increased visibility within the
court system of same-sex couples and the larger homosexual
community, the courts continued to struggle with providing that
community with the protections and legitimacy under the law that they
were seeking. 37 Although Alison D. continued the trend of the courts
in failing to legitimize homosexual couples and their families, it was
unique in that its dissent focused on the children who were affected the
most by the courts refusal to recognize their families. 38
B. Alison D. v. Virginia M.
Petitioner Alison and respondent Virginia, a homosexual
couple, had been in a relationship since September 1977. 39 In March
of 1980, after living together for two years, the couple decided to have

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Id.
Arsenault, supra note 26, at 813.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 813.
Arsenault, supra note 26, at 813.
Id.
Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2018], Art. 13

536

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

a baby. 40 In November of 1983, when the child was a little over two
years, the couple ended their relationship. 41 Virginia, who was the
child’s biological parent, maintained custody of the child. 42 Petitioner
Alison commenced the suit seeking visitation rights after Virginia
“terminated all contact between petitioner and the child, returning all
of petitioner’s gifts and letters.” 43
The Court, at the outset, refused to recognize Alison as a
parent; 44 Alison was described as “a biological stranger.” 45 The Court
of Appeals held that Alison had no standing to seek visitation rights
because she was neither the biological nor the adoptive parent of the
child. 46 The Court recognized that “although petitioner apparently
nurtured a close and loving relationship with the child, she [was] not a
parent within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 70.” 47
The Court disregarded Alison’s plea for a finding that she was
“a ‘de facto’ parent or that she should be viewed as a parent ‘by
estoppel.’” 48 Rather than balancing her claim with that of the
biological mother’s claim, the Court found that one cannot coexist with
the other. 49 The Court wrote that to award visitation, or even standing
to petition for visitation, would “impair the parents’ right to custody
and control.” 50 With the Court again citing to the DRL, it found that
standing is granted only to explicit categories of persons seeking
visitation, namely parents and grandparents. 51 The Court reasoned
40

Id.
Id.
42 Id.
43 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
44 Id. at 29. The Court refused to recognize Alison, even though she was the caretaker of
the child. Id.
45 Id. at 28.
46 Id. at 29.
47 Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
48 Id. at 29.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 states that “either parent may apply to the supreme court for a
writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before such court; and on the return
thereof, the court, on due consideration, may award the natural guardianship, charge and
custody of such child to either parent. . . .” DOM. REL. LAW § 72 provides that:
where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see
fit to intervene, a grandparent of the grandparents of such child may apply
to the supreme court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of
habeas corpus to have such child brought before such court . . . and on the
return thereof, the court, by order, after due notice to the parent or any
other person or party having the care, custody and control of such child,
41
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that, because “parent” is not defined, but grandparents are explicitly
granted standing, Alison, in a strictly biological sense, is not a parent
under the DRL. 52
In deciding not to interpret DRL § 70 in a broader fashion, the
Court perpetuated the idea that not all parents will be considered as
such under the law. 53 Understanding the ramifications of refusing to
acknowledge other forms of parents, the Court had received multiple
amicus curiae briefs, ranging from the National Organization for
Women to the Youth Law Center to several gay and lesbian parental
couples. 54 These amici believed that the case was centered on whether
the Court was ready to reexamine a system which fixes marriage and
biology as the end-all-be-all in determining who is a parent. 55
By interpreting DRL § 70 narrowly, the Court continued to
pursue a strict definition of parent, with serious consequences for
parents in a same-sex union. 56 Further, in fixing the biological
connection between a parent and child as the overriding claim to
parenting, the law “discriminates against the non-biological parent in
a same-sex couple because only one of the partners will ever have that
biological link.” 57 Not all justices subscribed to the majority view.58
In her dissent from the majority, Justice Kaye acknowledged the
ramifications of the Court’s decision. 59
C. Alison D.’s Dissent
Dissenting from the majority, Justice Kaye wrote that the
impact of the majority’s decision would have an effect on a “wide
spectrum of relationships––including those of longtime heterosexual
stepparents, ‘common-law’ and nonheterosexual partners. . . .” 60
Justice Kaye wrote “that as many as 8 to 10 million children who are

52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

to be given in such manner as the court shall prescribe, may make such
directions as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights
for such grandparent or grandparents in respect to such child.
Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
Arsenault, supra note 26, at 835.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id.
Arsenault, supra note 26, at 835. Justice Kaye was the only dissenting Justice.
Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Id.
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born into families with a gay or lesbian parent” would be affected,
implicating how far this decision would reach. 61 Highlighting the
vulnerability of children and making it the focus of her dissent, Justice
Kaye opined that the hardest hit would be those children who may be
losing someone critical to their development and emotional stability.62
Justice Kaye’s dissent would go on to be a highly cited dissent, and
was cited in the very case the Court of Appeals heard to overturn Alison
D. 63
D. Alison D.’s Aftermath
In the jurisprudence following Alison D., the Court continued
to struggle in recognizing the legitimacy of the family ties created by
same-sex couples. 64 The Court refused to allow nonbiological,
nonlegal parents to have standing to seek custody and visitation of the
children they had been raising with their same-sex partner. 65
1. In re Jacob
In November 1995, four years after deciding Alison D., the
Court of Appeals decided In re Jacob. 66 In re Jacob was a
consolidated case where single, unmarried adults––one homosexual
and one heterosexual––were seeking second parent adoptions. 67 In the
first case, Matter of Jacob, the biological parents separated prior to the
child’s birth and the mother was awarded sole custody. 68 The
biological mother’s boyfriend then sought to adopt the child, with the
biological father’s consent. 69 In Matter of Dana, the same-sex partner

61

Id. This language would later be quoted in Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 490.
Id.
63 See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, slip op. at 11-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)
citing cases that followed Justice Kaye’s dissent in Alison D., rev’d, 877 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App.
Div. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010), abrogated by Brooke S.B.,
61 N.E.3d 490.
64 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184; Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006);
In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995).
65 Id.
66 Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 398.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
62
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of the biological mother sought standing to adopt the biological
mother’s child. 70
Writing for the majority and mirroring her dissent in Alison D.,
Chief Justice Kaye noted that the primary goal of the adoption statute
at issue in Jacob was to protect the best interests of the child. 71 The
best interests of the child manifests itself as securing the best possible
home, with “the emotional security of knowing that in the event of the
biological parent’s death or disability, the other parent will have
presumptive custody. . . .” 72
Expressly revisiting Alison D., the Court wrote that by
permitting second parent adoptions, it would “achieve a measure of
permanency with both parent figures and avoid[] the sort of disruptive
visitation battle we faced in Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M.”73
When specifically dealing with homosexual couples, the Court noted
that New York does not prohibit a specific group from adopting based
solely on their sexual orientation. 74 In re Jacob, four years after Alison
D., represents an important step forward in the courts’ decisions
involving family.
2. Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D.
In July 2006, the New York Court of Appeals decided Matter
of Shondel J. v. Mark D. 75 In January 1996, Shondel gave birth to a
daughter, naming Mark as her biological father. 76 Mark, in a sworn
statement, accepted “all paternal responsibilities including child
support.” 77
Mark had publicly and privately held himself out to be the
child’s father. 78 According to Shondel, Mark saw the child regularly,
bought her toys, clothes, and other gifts, took the child to meet his
parents, regularly spoke on the telephone with the child, and called
himself “daddy” when talking to the child. 79 Mark also signed a
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 399.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 401.
Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d 610.
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 610.
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registry in Guyana stating that he was her father, authorized the change
of her last name to his, and made the child the primary beneficiary on
his life insurance policy. 80 After several years of holding himself out
to be the child’s father, Mark learned that he may not have been the
child’s biological father, which prompted his filing of the case. 81
The lower courts required DNA testing to determine paternity
because it was alleged that Mark was not the biological father of the
child. 82 The test proved that Mark was not the child’s biological father
and Mark sought to severe his legal and financial obligations to the
child. 83 Despite the paternity test result, the Court held that “a man
who has mistakenly represented himself as a child’s father may be
estopped from denying paternity . . . when the child justifiably relied
on the man’s representation of paternity, to the child’s detriment.” 84
Throughout the Court’s analysis, it continuously referred to the
best interests of the child as being the primary interest of both the court
and the legislature. 85 Utilizing the concept of parent by estoppel, the
Court of Appeals held that regardless of biological relation “Mark
represented that he was the father of the child, and she justifiably relied
on this representation, changing her position by forming a bond with
him, to her ultimate detriment.” 86 If the father was permitted to sever
his ties with her, after she relied so heavily on his representations, the
“cutting off of that support, whether emotional or financial, may leave
the child in a worse position than if that support had never been
given.” 87 The Court found this would be too much of a burden to put
on the innocent child, and found that Mark may not sever his ties and
must continue to support the child. 88 The resistance on the part of the
Court to sever this tie, regardless of biological relations, offered a
bright light to same-sex parents who do not have a biological
relationship to their child. 89

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 611.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 612.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 615-16.
Id. at 617.
Id.
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3. Debra H. v. Janice R.
A few years later, in 2010, the Court was again asked to discuss
Alison D. in Debra H. v. Janice R. 90 In this case, Debra and Janice
entered into a civil union in Vermont while Janice was pregnant. 91 The
Court, when asked to overrule or at least distinguish Alison D., refused
to do so claiming that Alison D. provided a simple-to-understand test
that allowed for efficiency and certainty. 92 Regardless of the
reaffirmation of Alison D., Debra was still permitted to seek visitation
with the child. 93
In the interest of comity, the New York court looked to
Vermont law to decide whether, in Vermont, Debra would have
standing to seek custody. 94 The Vermont law states that: Parties to a
civil union shall have “all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in marriage”
and that they shall enjoy the same rights “with respect to a child of
whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil
union,” as “those of a married couple.” 95
Since Debra would have standing in Vermont to seek visitation
and/or custody, and in the interest of comity, the Court held that she
could seek it in New York as well. 96
In giving full faith and credit to the Vermont law, the New York
Court moved farther from Alison D. and closer to allowing same-sex
parents’ custody and visitation. 97 As the States began dealing with the
issue of non-biological, non-legal parentage, the Federal Government
decided it needed to take steps to unify how the Courts would deal with
the parent-child relationship. 98
III.

DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, WINDSOR, AND OBERGEFELL

The Government passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
in an attempt to take certain steps toward unifying Courts’ handling of
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 184.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.
Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 195 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2018], Art. 13

542

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

parentage. 99 The passage of DOMA and two crucial subsequent
Supreme Court cases, however, created more confusion in the area of
same-sex parentage cases. 100
A. DOMA
Prior to Debra, the federal government attempted to discard the
Full Faith and Credit Clause 101 by enacting DOMA in September of
1996. 102 The 104th Congress amended the United States Code by
adding, after Section 1738B, that no State shall be required to afford
full faith and credit to a marriage of a same-sex couple performed in
another State. 103 Section Three of DOMA, entitled Definition of
Marriage, also amended the United States Code; this time amending
Chapter 1 of title 1 to have a seventh section which stated:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. 104
It took years for these definitions to be successfully
challenged. 105 These added provisions signaled to same-sex couples
that they would not be afforded standing to seek custody and/or
visitation absent a biological relation to his or her child. 106 There was
99

Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
Id., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013), Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2593.
101 The Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses the duties that all States have to respect, and
honor, the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. U.S. CONST. art.
IV § 1. In the case of this Note, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is particularly important
when dealing with legal marriages of same-sex couples in one state when there are children
involved. The Full Faith and Credit Clause was a round-about way for same-sex couples to
be married in State A and have children and then if the couple decided to divorce in State B
(where same-sex marriage was not permitted), State B would be forced to allow the nonbiological, non-adoptive parent to seek custody and/or visitation. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184.
102 Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419.
103 See Id. at §2(a).
104 See id. at §3(a).
105 Nina Totenberg, DOMA Challenge Tests Federal Definition of Marriage, NPR,
(March 26, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/03/27/175295410/doma-challenge-tests-federaldefinition-of-marriage.
106 Id.
100
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no longer a “back door” into standing for custody and visitation, as full
faith and credit was no longer given to same-sex unions performed in
other States. 107 A prime example of this refusal to recognize same-sex
marriages is the 2013 Supreme Court case, United States v. Windsor. 108
B. United States v. Windsor
Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer registered as domestic partners
in 1993, thirty years after they began their relationship. 109 When Spyer
became sick, the couple made a trip to Ontario in 2007, and got
married. 110 Spyer died in 2009, and left the entirety of her estate to
Windsor, who sought to qualify for the marital exemption from the
federal estate tax. 111 After being denied the exemption, Windsor
commenced a refund suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. 112
The Court held that DOMA, in injuring a specific class that
New York law sought to protect, violated basic due process and equal
protection principles that are applicable to the Federal Government. 113
The Act’s principal effect was to cherry-pick marriages and make them
unequal; the principal purpose was to impose inequality. 114 The Court,
highlighting why domestic partnerships and civil unions were
inadequate, stated that “responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the
dignity and integrity of the person.” 115 By creating contradictory
marriage schemes in which the marriages are recognized by New
York, but not under federal law, DOMA forced the same-sex couples
to live in a state of diminished stability and predictability of basic
107

Id.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
109 Id. at 2683.
110 Id.
111 Id. The exemption excludes from taxation “any interest in property which passes or has
passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse.” Id. Windsor paid $363,053 in estate taxes,
sought a refund and was denied that refund by the IRS. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
112 Id. at 2684. While the refund suit was pending, the Attorney General notified the
Speaker of the House that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the
constitutionality of DOMA, “noting that the Department has previously defended DOMA
against . . . challenges involving legally married same-sex couples.” Id. at 2683. According
to the A.G., “the President [had] concluded that given a number of factors, including a
documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny.” Id.
113 Id. at 2694.
114 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
115 Id. at 2694.
108
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personal relations; thus, undermining the public and private
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages. 116
The Court further noted:
[I]t (DOMA) tells those couples, and all the world, that
their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal
recognition. This places same-sex couples in an
unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage.
The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral
and sexual choices the Constitution protects, and whose
relationship the State has sought to dignify. And it
humiliates tens of thousands of children now being
raised by same-sex couples. 117
The Court then described the harm DOMA was doing to the
children of these same-sex marriages, including financial harm and
impacting their benefits upon the loss of a parent. 118 After deciding
that the definition of spouse offered in DOMA was unconstitutional,
the Court moved on to whether there was a fundamental right to marry
for same-sex couples. 119
C. Obergefell v. Hodges
In 2015, the Supreme Court again made history and declared
that, indeed, same-sex couples had the same fundamental right to
marry as opposite-sex couples. 120 In the landmark case of Obergefell,

116

Id.
Id.
118 Id. at 2695.
119 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584.
120 Id. at 2599. The Court discussed four principles and traditions that demonstrate the
reasons why marriage is fundamental under the Constitution for same-sex couples as well as
heterosexual couples. Id. First, “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in
the concept of individual autonomy.” Id. Second “the right to marry is fundamental because
is supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. Thirdly, the right to marry “safeguards children
and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
education.” Id. at 2600. Finally, the majority stated that “this Court’s cases and the Nation’s
traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.” Id. at 2601.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, while Obergefell has yet to be overturned, many
States have not acted on the Court’s landmark decision. Specifically, the very States involved
in Obergefell (Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee) have yet to conform their State
Constitutions to reflect that same-sex married couples are afforded the same rights and
protections offered to heterosexual couples. What seems to be the case, however, is that the
117
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the petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose
partners were deceased. 121 The couples were from four different states,
all of which regulated marriage to be “a union between one man and
one woman.” 122
Petitioners sought to be placed on an equal playing field with
opposite-sex couples; they were seeking the rights and benefits
afforded to heterosexual couples. 123 These benefits included the
protection of “child custody, support, and visitation rules.” 124 Without
the right to marry, these couples were not guaranteed such
protection. 125 The right to marry would also provide protection to
“children and families, and thus, draws meaning from related rights of
childbearing, procreation and education.” 126 The right to marry would
“allow[] children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their
own family and its concord with other families in their community and
daily lives.’” 127 While keeping the best interest of the children at the
forefront, the Court held that the institution of marriage grants the
permanence and stability that is so vital to children. 128
Obergefell v. Hodges addressed the fundamental right of every
individual, regardless of sexual orientation, to decide whom they love
and want to marry. 129 In so holding, the Court granted the legitimacy
and recognition under the law that same-sex couples, and their
families, had been seeking for decades. 130 By granting this legitimacy,
the Court was finally giving some protection to the children whom
Justice Kaye expressed concern about decades ago in Alison D.131
However, just because the marriages themselves were given
legitimacy, it did not mean that such recognition would extend to the
relationships that had not been solemnized by the government.132
States are no longer enforcing the DOMA-like language contained in their Constitutions. See
generally Arsenault, supra note 25.
121 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
122 Id. The Court began with a history of marriage and its evolution over the course of the
Nation’s history. Id. at 2595-99.
123 Id. at 2601.
124 Id.
125 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
126 Id. at 2600.
127 Id. (citation omitted).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 2602.
130 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
131 Id.
132 Totenberg, supra note 105.
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Without the protections now afforded to same-sex married couples,
unmarried couples are still left with relatively little protections when it
comes to their families and seeking custody and visitation of their
children. 133
IV.

RECOGNIZING DIFFERENT KINDS OF PARENTS

The Supreme Court decisions in Windsor and Obergefell
granted recognition and provided protection to same-sex married
couples. 134 As States have tried to reconcile the new order of things
after Obergefell; they have instituted numerous definitions and
applications of the definition of a parent under the law. 135
A. The Psychological Parent
The concept of a psychological parent “arose in the 1970’s
during custody disputes between husband and wife, natural parents and
foster parents, or unfit parents and grandparents.” 136 Today, the
psychological parent is one who, “on a continuing and regular basis,
provides for a child’s emotional and physical needs.” 137 In order to
establish that an individual is a psychological parent, the party seeking
custody or visitation must meet the following requirements:
(1) they must not be the child’s legal parent; (2) they
must have, with the consent of the child’s legal parent,
resided with the child within a significant period of
time; (3) they must have routinely performed at least an
equal share of the caretaking functions with the child’s
primary caregiver without any expectation of
compensation for the care. 138
There are a multitude of other factors many different courts
have considered as well, including “whether a parent-child bond [has

133

Id.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2593.
135 Id.
136 Caroline L. Kinsey, Article: Revisiting the Role of Psychological Parent in the
Dissolution of the Homosexual Relationship, 19 BUFF. J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 75, 82
(2011).
137 Id. at 81-82.
138 Id. at 82.
134
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been] forged and whether [the parents] have held themselves out to the
public generally as a single-family unit.” 139
The bond between the psychological parent and child is
one forged over countless hours and interactions. 140 These first
attachments with the psychological parent “form the base from which
any further relationships develop.” 141 If the relationship is firmly
maintained, that bond becomes immensely productive on both the
intellectual and the social development of the child. 142 Withdrawing
such support, voluntarily or by court order, can have serious
detrimental effects on the child who has that strong bond. 143 In States
that recognize the label of psychological parent, a party labeled as such
will be provided standing to seek custody and visitation. 144
The impetus now is for the psychological parent label, and the
legal benefits that come with that label, to be applied to homosexual
couples. 145 In the past, such a label only applied to heterosexual
couples. 146 However, it is the argument of this Note that a party not
biologically related to the subject child would not “infringe upon the
‘constitutional right [of legal parents] to direct the upbringing of their
children.’” 147
1. Jurisdictional Discussion
The lack of cohesion has led to different interpretations of the
psychological parent doctrine from state to state. 148 In S.F. v. M.D.,149
139

Id. at 82.
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 18 (The Free Press, 2nd ed. 1979).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Specifically, in the context of this Note, the legal benefits of being recognized as a
psychological parent, and the ability to have standing when seeking custody and/or visitation
as a direct result of having that label.
146 Kinsey, supra note 136, at 81.
147 Id. at 85 (citation omitted).
148 Id. at 86. For a more robust discussion including many different states, see id. at 86-93.
For the purpose of this Note, the author will be focusing on the northeastern states and how
they have handled, if at all, the psychological parent doctrine.
149 751 A.2d 9, 10 (Md. 2000). In this case, Appellant and Appellee, a female same-sex
couple, began living together in 1991. Id. In 1994, Appellee was artificially inseminated and
gave birth. Id. The case centered on whether the Appellant had a right to visitation with the
minor child. Id.
140
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a case of first impression, Maryland’s highest court borrowed the
Wisconsin four-prong test for determining if a psychological parent
relationship was present. 150 The four-prong test required that:
To demonstrate the existence of the petitioner’s parentlike relationship with the child, the petitioner must
prove four elements: (1) that the biological or adoptive
parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s
formation and establishment of a parent-like
relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and
the child lived together in the same household; (3) that
the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child’s care,
education, and development, including contributions
towards the child’s support, without expectation of
financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has
been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to
have established with the child a bonded, dependent
relationship parental in nature. 151
Using this test, Maryland held that a non-legal parent was
entitled to standing in seeking visitation with the child. 152
In conjunction with the Maryland and Wisconsin cases, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the psychological parent label
in the case V.C. v. M.J.B. 153 This case identified the non-legal parent
is a psychological parent. 154 The court stated that the termination of
the partner’s relationship did not necessarily mean that the relationship
between the psychological parent and the child terminated as well.155
Highlighting the fact that the legal parent fostered the non-legal
parent’s relationship with the child, the New Jersey court shut down
critics who believed there to be a slippery slope argument. 156
Requiring the legal parent to foster the relationship between the child
150

Kinsey, supra note 136, at 87-88.
Holtzman v. Knolt (In re custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
152 S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 15, 17 (Md. 2000). While this case did allow the petitioner to
seek visitation, during the subsequent hearing it was found that visitation was causing
behavioral problems with the child. When visitation stopped, so did the behavioral problems.
Id. at 19.
153 V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 552.
156 Id.
151
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and the non-legal parent preserves the psychological parent title from
part-time babysitters and visitors. 157
2. Psychological Parent in New York
New York is known as one of the first states to severely restrict
the rights of psychological parents. 158 In 1986, the Third Department
heard Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 159 in which the Petitioner and
Respondent were both high school students who engaged in sexual
relations without protection. 160 The Respondent, however, was also
engaged in a sexual relationship with another individual, Michael
Walpole. 161 Michael, as later blood grouping tests proved, fathered a
child with the Respondent, but it was the Petitioner who lived
intermittently with the Respondent and the subject child. 162 The
Family Court found that extraordinary circumstances existed, namely
that the Respondent had “encouraged and condoned the father-son
relationship which developed between Petitioner and (the subject
child).” 163
These extraordinary circumstances permitted the Petitioner
standing to seek custody of the subject child. 164 The record amply
supported the Court’s holding that the attachment formed between the
two, even though there was no biological relation, was an
extraordinary circumstance; thus, granting standing for Petitioner to
seek custody and/or visitation of the child. 165 The Appellate Court did
not, however, hold that the Petitioner could exercise visitation with the
child, only that the Petitioner had standing to petition the Court for the
opportunity to be granted visitation. 166 The Appellate Division refused
157

Kinsey, supra note 136, at 90.
Id. at 93.
159 502 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
160 Id. at 824.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 825. Some of the factors the Court looked to were the parties had lived together
for many months during the first two years of the child’s life, the petitioner was held out as
the child’s father, the petitioners name was listed on the birth certificate, and petitioner was
called “daddy” by the child. Ronald FF, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 825. There were also psychologists
for both sides who stated that to remove petitioner from the child’s life would have a
“wrenching affect” that should be avoided if possible. Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 825. In this case, the Petitioner was granted visitation rights with the subject child.
166 Ronald FF, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
158
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to decide, or offer dicta, on whether granting the Petitioner the right to
visitation was in the best interest of the subject child. 167 While this
established the doctrine of psychological parent in New York, a
question remains as to whether or not the non-legal, non-biological
parent was actually awarded visitation with the subject-child.
In 1987, the Appellate Division reversed a Family Court
decision that granted the psychological parent the right to visitation.168
In Dehar v. Dehar, 169 the Family Court awarded custody of
Christopher Dehar to Angelo Iacono, the former boyfriend of
Christopher’s biological mother, while denying custody to the child’s
biological father. 170 Respondent mother then sought review of the
Family Court order. 171
The Appellate Court relied on the precedent set by Ronald FF,
concluding that “the psychological parenthood of a nonparent alone
[does not] constitute[] extraordinary circumstance[s]. . . .” 172 While
the Court denied custody to the nonbiological parent, the Court also
concluded that a claim made by a non-legal parent would be
insufficient when the rights of the legal parent were undisputed. 173 The
Appellate Division also placed firm boundaries around what would
affect the legal parents’ rights when it came to custody, stating
exclusively that only “surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent
neglect, unfortunate or involuntary extended disruption of custody, or
other equivalent but rare extraordinary circumstance which would
drastically affect the welfare of the child,” would be able to interfere
with those rights. 174 Again, the Appellate Court did not extend custody
rights to a psychological parent. 175 While the parents were not married,
the fact that the Court refused to extend standing to a psychological

167

Id.
Dehar v. Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
169 Id. at 335.
170 Id. at 336.
171 Id.
172 Id. In addition to holding that the bond of a psychological parent was not an
extraordinary circumstance, the Appellate Division also held that the Bennett test, was
inapplicable. Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The Bennett test guided the courts by principles
which reflected the societal judgements regarding the family unit and parenthood when
considering the child’s best interest. Bennett v. Jefferys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549 (N.Y. 1976).
173 Kinsey, supra note 136, at 94.
174 Dehar, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
175 Id.
168

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss2/13

20

Mahoney: The “Legal Stranger” and Parent

2018

THE “LEGAL STRANGER” AND PARENT

551

parent is of import when considering the extent of the relationship the
would-be parent and the subject-child had. 176
As recently as 2010, New York still did not acknowledge a
psychological parent when deciding custody. 177 In Debra H. v. Janice
R., 178 Debra bought a proceeding against Janice seeking joint legal and
physical custody of the six-year-old boy conceived during the couple’s
relationship. 179 The New York Court of Appeals held that without a
second-parent adoption, the petitioner had no standing to seek custody
or visitation. 180
Citing to both Bennett and Ronald FF., the Court of Appeals
found that the extraordinary circumstances rule does not apply to a
“biological stranger” regardless of the fact that the couple were
married. 181 Rather than accepting evidence that displayed the
attachment of the nonbiological parent to the child, the Court stated
that it required adoption, which would have granted Debra legal
standing. 182 Holding firm to their bright line rule decided in Alison D.,
the New York court found that:
The flexible type of rule championed by Debra H.
threatens to trap the single biological and adoptive
parents and their children in a limbo of doubt. These
parents could not possibly know for sure when another
adult’s level of involvement in family life might reach
the tipping point and jeopardize their right to bring up
their children without the unwanted participation of a
third party. 183
The Court ignored the fact that the biological parent
encouraged the nonbiological parent to adopt the child, evidencing the
biological parent’s willingness to have a relationship develop between
the nonbiological parent and subject-child. 184 The Court, thus, found
that the nonbiological parent had no right to seek custody or visitation,
176

Id.
Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 184.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 186-87.
180 Id. at 194. Debra H. also decided a comity issue. See discussion supra Section II, D.
Debra and Janice entered into a civil union in Vermont while Janice was pregnant. Id. at 186.
181 Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 190.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 193.
184 Id.
177
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and to give her that right would infringe on the right of the biological
parent. 185
B. De Facto Parent
As defined in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 2.03(c):
[A] de facto parent is an individual other than a legal
parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant
period of time not less than two years, (i) lived with the
child and, (ii) for reasons primarily other than financial
compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent
to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a
complete failure or inability of any legal parent to
perform caretaking functions, (A) regularly performed
a majority of the caretaking function for the child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions
at least as great as that of the parent with whom the
child primarily lived. 186
In Comment c. ALI notes that the law most closely
approximating this criterion is that of Wisconsin. 187
Other
jurisdictions have defined a de facto parent in a less stringent fashion,
with fewer requirements placed upon the parent attempting to meet this
status of parent. 188 For example, Massachusetts has defined a de facto
parent as someone without a biological relationship, but who typically
resides with the child and performs a share of the caretaking
185

Id. at 193.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 108 (American Law Institute, 1st softcover ed. 2003).
187 Id. at 131. Wisconsin allows visitation (but not custody) to be awarded to an individual
who has formed a “parent-like relationship” with a child if:
(1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to the formation and
establishment of a parent-like relationship, (2) the petitioner and the child
lived together in the same household, (3) the petitioner assumed
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development,
including contributing towards the child’s support without expectation of
financial compensation, and (4) the parental role assumed by the petition
was for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded, dependent
relationship parental in nature.
Id.
188 Care & Protection of Sharlene, 445 Mass. 756, 766 (Mass. 2006), (citing ALI PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §2.03 (1)(b)).
186
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responsibilities. 189 The petitioner must be a participant in the child’s
life as a member of the child’s family. 190
1. Other Jurisdictional Approaches to De Facto
Parents
Adopting a less stringent definition, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, in Care & Protection of Sharlene, 191 decided a case in
which a child’s stepfather was seeking to be declared Sharlene’s de
facto parent. 192 During the trial court’s hearing, petitioner described
his relationship with Sharlene over the four years he lived with her.193
He testified that he supported her financially, attended dance recitals,
and generally took an interest in her welfare. 194 He testified that
Sharlene, around her friends, referred to him as “her father.” 195 He
conceded that he did not perform much of Sharlene’s parenting
functions, nor did he testify as to his knowledge of Sharlene’s injuries
and the way they were inflicted, invoking his Fifth Amendment
right. 196
When the child was admitted to Baystate Medical Center on
September 11, 2005, she arrived with critical injuries and remained in
an irreversible vegetative state until the Department of Social Services,
who had been granted custody of Sharlene, asked the court’s
permission to withdraw life support. 197 The trial judge granted the
189

Id.
Id.
191 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 756.
192 Id. The Department of Social Services argued that petitioner had only been interviewed
once as a part of a home visit, because he was not “available.” Id. at 764. Petitioner had left
the day before Sharlene was brought to the hospital, knowing she had been injured and was
throwing up, but did nothing to check on her. Id. Sharlene’s guardian ad litem also argued
that, given the extent both physically and chronologically of Sharlene’s injuries, that petitioner
had to know––if not a participant––of the habitual abuse of Sharlene. Id.
193 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 764.
194 Id. at 763.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 758. On September 13, the Department of Social Services filed a care and
protection petition and received custody of Sharlene. Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 757. On
September 22, Sharlene’s adoptive mother, who was her only legal guardian, died. Id.
Sharlene’s biological mother was sixteen when she had Sharlene and was not married to
Sharlene’s biological father. Id. at 758. When Sharlene was four, she was sent to live with her
aunt, who would later become her adoptive mother. Id. That same year, after it was determined
Sharlene was sexually abused by her biological mother’s boyfriend, the Department of Social
Services received custody of Sharlene. Id. She was permitted to stay at her aunt’s home as a
190
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motion to withdraw life support and provided that his decision was to
be made available only to persons connected with the case. 198 Given
the evidence presented, the trial judge found that the petitioner did not
provide a majority of the caretaking functions of the child. 199 The
judge also concluded that, because the petitioner was not the legal,
adoptive, putative, or de facto father of Sharlene, he would not be
allowed to participate as a party in the hearing regarding withdrawal
of life support. 200 The petitioner then challenged the denial of his
motion for de facto parental status, and sought a new hearing on the
withdrawal of life support in which he, as the de facto parent, would
have a voice. 201
After reaching the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, the Court
affirmed the lower court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to be deemed
Sharlene’s de facto parent. 202 The Court noted:
[A] de facto parent must live with the child for not less
than two years and that the caretaking relationship have
been established “for reasons primarily other than
financial compensation, and with the agreement of a
legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a
result of a complete failure of inability of any legal
parent to perform caretaking functions.” 203
The Court also noted that, given the precedent set, the ties
between a child and a de facto parent must be loving and nurturing. 204
In its holding, the Court discussed petitioners lack of evidence that
proved his loving and nurturing relationship with Sharlene. 205
Ultimately deciding against allowing petitioner to attain de facto
foster child. Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 758. In February of 2000, petitioner began living in the
home and married Sharlene’s aunt in September of 2001. Id. In October 2001, Sharlene was
adopted by her aunt as a single parent. Id. The guardian ad litem report disclosed multiple
instances of child abuse and investigations involving Sharlene and her two siblings. Id.
198 Id.
199 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 764.
200 Id. at 766.
201 Id. Petitioner also argued that the public should be allowed access to all proceedings,
except the new hearing he was requesting, and all relevant documents. Id. The Court, while
questioning if petitioner had standing to bring a claim on behalf of the public, ultimately denied
petitioner’s request to make the proceedings and documents public. Id.
202 Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 756.
203 Id. at 766 (quoting ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §2.03(c)).
204 Id. at 768.
205 Id. The Court had difficulty finding evidence that the relationship was even beneficial
to the child. Id.
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parent status, the Court held that “to recognize petitioner as a de facto
parent . . . is unthinkable in the circumstances of this case and would
amount to an illogical and unprincipled perversion of the doctrine.” 206
Sharlene’s case contains the important belief that in order to be
considered a de facto parent, the would-be parent must have a loving
relationship with the child. 207 This places an important limit upon who
may be considered a de facto parent under the law. 208 While the
petitioner may have met a definition of de facto parent, without the
loving relationship, the best interest of the child would not be met.209
The Massachusetts Courts have granted standing to seek custody and
visitation to de facto parents when this factor is present. 210
Massachusetts, however, allowed de facto parents a legal right
to custody and visitation in E.N.O. v. L.M.N.. 211 The parties were two
women who were engaged in a committed and monogamous
relationship for thirteen years. 212 In 1991, they decided that the
defendant would be artificially inseminated with their child. 213 The
plaintiff attended all insemination appointments and participated in all
medical decisions. 214 In 1994, the couple became pregnant and,
throughout the complicated pregnancy, plaintiff took care of defendant
and attended every doctors visit. 215
Before the child was born, and again after, the two women
executed a co-parenting agreement, which “expressed the parties’
intent that the plaintiff retain her parental status even if the defendant
and the plaintiff were to separate.” 216 When the child was born, the
plaintiff acted as a birthing coach, cut the baby’s umbilical cord, stayed
overnight at the hospital, was given a parent hospital bracelet, was
listed as parent on the birth announcements, and shares a last name
with the child. 217 She assumed financial responsibility of the child and
206

Sharlene, 445 Mass. at 768.
Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 429 Mass. 824 (Mass. 1999).
212 Id. at 825.
213 Id. Before beginning the insemination, both parties attended workshops to learn about
the process and typical parenting issues that may arise. Id.
214 Id.
215 E.N.O., 429 Mass. at 825.
216 Id. The defendant also executed documents authorizing the plaintiff to care for the child
as a parent.
217 Id.
207
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assumed primary care of the child when the defendant was
experiencing medical issues. 218
While engaged in adoption
proceedings, the couple’s relationship began to deteriorate until they
finally separated in May 1998. 219 At this point, the defendant denied
plaintiff access to the child. 220
After seeking custody and visitation, the plaintiff was awarded
temporary visitation by a Probate Court judge. 221 Upon further review
by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, it affirmed the lower court’s
decision. 222 Considering the child’s nontraditional family, the Court
held that:
[T]he de facto parent resides with the child and, with
the consent and encouragement of the legal parent,
performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great
as the legal parent. The de facto parent shapes the
child’s daily routine, addresses his developmental
needs, disciplines the child, provides for his education
and medical care, and serves as a moral guide. 223
The Massachusetts Court decided that given the increasing
number of “nontraditional” families, “the best interests (of the
children) calculus must include an examination of the child’s
relationship with both his legal and de facto parent.” 224 As such, the
Court held unequivocally that the plaintiff was the child’s de facto
parent. 225

218

Id. at 826.
Id.
220 E.N.O., 429 Mass. at 826. In June 1998, the plaintiff sought specific performance of the
parties’ agreement to allow the plaintiff to adopt and assume joint custody of and visitation
with the child.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 834.
223 Id. at 829 (referencing ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION §2.03(6)).
224 Id.
225 E.N.O., 429 Mass. at 830. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff participated in the child’s
life as a member of the child’s family (the child said he had two moms). Id. The parties
decided to have a child together and form that family; they also re-executed the co-parenting
agreement. Acting as parent’s to the child, and keeping the child’s best interests in mind, they
stated their wish to continue plaintiff’s relationship with the child regardless of the status of
the parties’ relationship. Id. The plaintiff, with the defendant’s consent and encouragement,
participated in the raising of the child. Id. The child’s guardian ad litem found that the plaintiff
was an active parent, who supported the family financially as well as emotionally. E.N.O.,
429 Mass. at 830. The defendant furthered that relationship by representing the plaintiff as the
child’s parent in public. Id. The plaintiff was authorized to make medical decisions for the
219
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The Court disagreed with the defendant’s assertions that to
allow the plaintiff visitation was to restrict her fundamental right as a
fit parent to the custody of her child. 226 In disregarding this assertion,
the Court balanced the defendant’s interest in protecting her custody
right with the child’s best interest in maintaining the child’s
relationship with the de facto parent. 227 However, in that balance, the
child’s best interests must always supersede the parents’ interests.228
Bearing that in mind, the Massachusetts Court allowed the plaintiff, as
a de facto parent, to have custody and visitation rights of her child. 229
2. New York’s Approach to De Facto Parents
New York, in dealing with de facto parents, has been more
lenient when granting custody and visitation rights to such parents.230
The seminal case when discussing the doctrine of de facto parents in
New York is In re Jacob. 231 After the decision handed down by the
Court of Appeals of New York in Alison D., it seemed that
nonbiological parents would not gain custody of their children. 232
However, In re Jacob, penned by Judge Kaye who dissented in Alison
D., held that both parents seeking custody rights to the children were
permitted those rights. 233
In the consolidated cases of Jacob, there were favorable home
visits, healthy and stable children, encouragement from the biological
parent in the fostering of a parent-child relationship with the de facto
parent, and manifestations from the children that the de facto parent
was thought of as a traditional definition of parent. 234 Judge Kaye, in

child and was designated as the child’s guardian in the event of defendant’s death or inability
to care for the child. Id.
226 Id. at 832.
227 Id. at 833. The defendant’s parental rights cannot be stretched to extinguish the child’s
relationship with the plaintiff. The defendant’s right will not be enforced to the detriment of
the child.
228 E.N.O., 429 Mass at 833.
229 Id. at 834.
230 Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 669. As a reminder, Jacob was a combination of two cases in which proposed
adoptive parents petitioned the family courts to adopt. Id. at 656. One appellant petitioned to
adopt his girlfriend’s son (with permission of the biological father). Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 656.
The other sought adoption of the child of her lesbian partner. Id.
234 Id. at 656-57.
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reversing both lower court’s decisions, promoted “the statute’s
legislative purpose––the child’s best interest.” 235
She discussed not only the economic benefits such as social
security and life insurance benefits but also what she deems “the
emotional security of knowing that in the event of the biological
parent’s death or disability, the other parent will have presumptive
custody, and the children’s relationship with their parents, siblings and
other relatives will continue should the co-parents separate.” 236 The
Court held that denying the children the opportunity of having de facto
parents become two legal parents would be unjust and not in the best
interests of the children. 237 The Court allowed the de facto parents to
adopt the children of their partner, regardless of their marital status or
sexual orientation. 238
More recently, the same Court of Appeals decided Brooke.239
The Court returned to Justice Kaye’s dissent from Alison D.,
discussing the negative impact on the children. 240 The Court discussed
that “[a] growing body of social science reveals the trauma children
suffer as a result of separation from a primary attachment figure––such
as a de facto parent––regardless of that figure’s biological or adoptive
ties to the children.” 241 While making huge steps forward for
nonbiological parents in overruling Alison D., the Court still fell short
in establishing any kind of test for parental figures who wish to seek
custody or visitation. 242
The Court’s guidance applies only to an exclusive group of
couples, those who have a pre-conception agreement to conceive and
raise children as co-parents, to have standing to seek custody and

235

Id. at 658.
Id. at 658-59. The Court of Appeals also found that an adoption in these cases––and
many others––does not necessarily require a termination of biological parental rights where
the two have agreed that the biological parent will maintain his or her rights. Jacob, 660 N.E.2d
at 659.
237 Id. at 667.
238 Id. at 669.
239 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488. This decision expressly reversed Alison D. and held “that
where a petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has agreed to
conceive and raise the child as co-parents, the petitioner has presented sufficient evidence to
achieve standing to seek custody and visitation of the child.” Id. at 501.
240 Id. at 494. “The rule of Alison D. has inflicted disproportionate hardship on the growing
number of nontraditional families across our State.” Id. at 499.
241 Id.
242 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500.
236
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visitation. 243 If another parental figure comes forward seeking custody
or visitation with such agreement, the lower courts of New York would
have to rely on either Alison D. or In re Jacob. 244 This uncertainty will
most likely result in conflicting views of who is permitted to seek
custody and visitation when the nonbiological parent would be
considered a de facto parent. 245
C. Parent by Estoppel
The advantage of adopting a parent by estoppel doctrine is that
the child’s best interest is at the very forefront of the Court’s
consideration of each set of circumstances. 246 The best interest of the
child is contained in the very definition of parent by estoppel.247
According to the ALI Principles:
[A] parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not
a legal parent (i) is obligated to pay child support under
Chapter 3; or (ii) lived with the child for at least two
years and (A) over that period has a reasonable, goodfaith belief that he was the child’s biological father,
based on marriage to the mother or on the actions or
representations of the mother, and fully accepted
parental responsibilities consistent with that belief, and
(B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed,
continued to make reasonable, good-faith efforts to
accept responsibilities as the child’s father; or (iii) lived
with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and
accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent,
as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the
child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents,
both parents) to raise a child together each with full
parental rights and responsibilities, when the court
finds that recognition of the individual as a parent is in
the child’s best interests; or (iv) lived with the child for
at least two years, holding out and accepting full and
permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an
243
244
245
246
247

Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 186, at 107.
Id.
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agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two
legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s
best interests. 248
After a co-parent meets the requirements of parent by estoppel,
that person has the rights and privileges of a legal parent. 249 These
rights include the crucial requirement of standing to bring an action for
custody. 250 In this situation, the co-parent has gained “a presumption
of custodial time, joint allocation of decision making, right of access
to school and health records and priority over de facto and non-parents
in the allocation of custody;” thus, granting the co-parents parity with
the legal parent. 251
Most parent by estoppel cases take place in the context of
paternity by estoppel, as illustrated by the language of the definition.252
Estoppel considered in the area of paternity law is “applied to prevent
a presumptive father (the husband), or the natural mother (the wife),
from denying the husband’s paternity if the couple has resided together
as husband and wife and the husband held the child out as his own.”253
As such, if the mother leads the presumptive father to believe that he
is the biological father through fraud or misrepresentation, he is not
estopped from denying paternity, as long as, when the fraud is
revealed, he ceases to have contact with the child. 254
1. Jurisdictional Approach to Parent by Estoppel
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in a case of first
impression, decided Conroy v. Rosenwald, 255 which involved
248

Id.
Margaret S. Osborne, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for
Lesbian Co-Parents, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 389 (2004).
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Jacqulyn A. West, Maintaining the Legal Fiction: Application of the Presumption of
Paternity and Paternity by Estoppel in Pennsylvania, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 582 (2004). The
continued use of “father” and “mother” in the definition lends one to belief that, at least when
constructing §2.03(1)(b), the heterosexual family was given priority. Id.
253 Heather Faust, Challenging the Paternity of Children Born During Wedlock: An
Analysis of Pennsylvania Law Regarding the Effects of the Doctrines of Presumption of
Legitimacy and Paternity by Estoppel on the Admissibility of Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity, 100 DICK. L. REV. 963, 979 (1996).
254 West, supra note 251, at 582.
255 940 A.2d 409, 411 (Pa. Super. Ct., 2007).
249
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estopping a father from denying paternity of his child and reinstating a
prior child support order in favor of the mother. 256 The mother had a
relationship with Michael and a married man, Glen Rosenwald, at the
time of conception. 257 Prior to the birth of the child, and continuing
for about two and one-half years thereafter, Michael and the mother
lived together, although there were frequent periods of separation. 258
After some time with the mother and child, Michael claimed that he
had DNA evidence to prove that he was not the father of the child.259
Subsequently, the mother filed for support against Glen, who requested
the motion be dismissed on grounds of paternity by estoppel. 260 The
lower Court refused to dismiss the petition and ordered Glen to pay
child support. 261
On appeal, the Superior Court held that the concept of estoppel
has been used in various cases involving paternity and support, finding
the nature of the conduct and the effect on the father and child and their
relationship that is the focus of such a concept. 262 While considering
the equitable remedy of paternity by estoppel, the most important
factor the courts look to is the best interests of the child. 263 Using this
doctrine, the Court held that it was inappropriate to deny Glen’s
request for a dismissal. 264
In examining the facts of the case, the Superior Court found
that the mother listed Michael as the child’s father on the birth
certificate, the mother and Michael functioned as a family unit and
acted as the child’s parents for years, the mother instituted two actions
against Michael for child support, and even after the mother and
Michael ended their relationship, he continued to exercise partial
custody of the child. 265 Given these facts and the relationship

256 Id. The biological mother, Jennifer Conroy was having a sexual relationship with both
alleged father by estoppel Michael Guinan and Appellant Glen Rosenwald. Id. The Family
Court found that Rosenwald was the legal father of the child as of May 21, 2001, and that
Conroy was estopped from claiming he was the father prior to that date. Id. at 414.
257 Id.
258 Rosenwald, 940 A.2d at 414.
259 Id. at 412.
260 Id. at 413.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 416.
263 Rosenwald, 940 A.2d at 419.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 414.
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established between Michael and the subject-child, the Court found
that the action instated against Glen was estopped. 266
2. New York’s Approach to Parent by Estoppel
Historically, New York has approached parent by estoppel like
most other States, namely, as a doctrine applicable to paternity
cases. 267 However, in the second half of 2016, Justice Abdus-Salaam
wrote the opinion in the landmark New York Court of Appeals case,
Brooke, which overruled Alison D. and granted standing to two parents
seeking custody and/or visitation using the doctrine of parent by
estoppel. 268
In the Matter of Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A. C.C. combined two
similar appeals in which petitioners lacked any biological or adoptive
connection to the children who were at the center of the dispute. 269 The
parties directed the attention of the Court to Alison D. and asked it to
answer the question of whether “in an unmarried couple, a partner
without a biological or adoptive relation to a child is [] that child’s
‘parent’ for purposes of standing to seek custody or visitation under
Domestic Relations Law §70. . . .” 270 The Court boldly overruled
Alison D. and held “that where a partner shows by clear and convincing
evidence that the parties agreed to conceive a child and to raise the
child together, the non-biological, non-adoptive partner has standing
to seek visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70.” 271
In the first appeal, the same-sex couple began dating in 2006,
and soon thereafter announced their symbolic engagement. 272 Then
the couple jointly agreed to have a child together that the respondent
would carry. 273 The petitioner attended prenatal appointments, was
involved in prenatal care, including being present in the emergency
room when the respondent had complications related to the

266

Id. at 420.
See generally Arsenault, supra note 26.
268 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488.
269 Id. at 490.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. Due to lack of financial means, the couple could not travel to another jurisdiction
that allowed same-sex marriage. Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490. Also hindering the couple
was the fact that, at this time in New York jurisprudence, the Court was unclear about whether
it would recognize the validity of an out-of-state same-sex marriage. Id.
273 Id. at 491.
267
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pregnancy. 274 Petitioner was present during labor and delivery, and
cut the cord at birth. 275 Additionally, the child was given the
petitioner’s last name. 276
In 2010, when the parties ended their relationship, respondent
maintained custody of the boy and allowed petitioner to have regular
visits with the child.277 After two years of regular visitation,
respondent and petitioner’s relationship deteriorated and by July 2013,
petitioner’s contact with the child was effectively terminated by
respondent. 278 Petitioner then filed suit seeking joint custody and
regular visitation. 279
The second appeal involved in this case, Estrellita A. v.
Jennifer D., 280 involved a couple that began dating (and subsequently
moved in together) in 2003. In 2007, after filing for domestic
partnership, the couple decided to have a baby with respondent
carrying the child. 281 Similar to Brooke, the petitioner attended the
prenatal medical appointments and was called “Mama” by the baby
girl. 282 In September 2012, after ending the relationship in May 2012,
the petitioner moved out of the home, but continued to have contact
with the child. 283 Petitioner filed suit seeking visitation with the
child. 284 When respondent sought to dismiss the petition based on lack
274

Id.
Id.
276 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 491. The parties lived together with the child and raised his
jointly. Id. They shared all major parental responsibilities. Id. For a year of the boy’s life,
petitioner stayed home with him so that respondent could return to work. Id. The boy called
petitioner “Mama B.” Id.
277 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 491.
278 Id.
279 Id. The Family Court appointed attorney found that the best interest of the child would
be served by allowing regular visitation. Id. Family Court dismissed the petition, claiming
that plaintiff/petitioner did not have standing under Domestic Relations Law § 70 to seek
custody and/or visitation with the child. Id. Family Court noted that petitioner did not adopt
the child and noted the constraint on it by Alison D. The Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed, concluding that there was no legal or biological relation to the child, Alison D.
prohibited a ruling that petitioner had standing under Domestic Relations Law § 70. Brooke
S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 491.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 491-92. The couple also decided that the donor would be of the same ethnicity as
the petitioner. Id. at 492.
282 Id. The three resided in the couple’s home while the two shared a complete range of
parental responsibilities. Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 492.
283 Id.
284 Id. In a suit pending at the same time, respondent was seeking child support from
petitioner, who denied liability. Id. The court appointed an attorney for the child. Id. After a
hearing, the Family Court granted the child support petition, holding that “‘the uncontroverted
275
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of standing under Alison D., both the attorney for the child and the
attorney for petitioner opposed. 285 When hearing the petition, the
Court held “that petitioner’s regular visitation and consultation on
matters of import with respect to the child would serve the child’s best
interests.” 286
Under Alison D., the Court had held that the word parent in
DRL § 70 should be interpreted narrowly, precluding standing “for a
de facto parent who, under a theory of equitable estoppel, might
otherwise be recognized as the child’s parent for visitation
purposes.” 287 The Brooke Court criticized its predecessors, stating
that, “[d]eparting from [the] tradition of invoking equity, in Alison D.,
we narrowly defined the term ‘parent,’ thereby foreclosing ‘all inquiry
into the child’s best interest’ in custody and visitation cases involving
parental figures who lacked biological or adoptive ties to the child.”288
As a result, the Court found itself in a legal landscape that prevented a
non-biological, non-adoptive parent from disclaiming parentage and
required to pay child support, all while being denied standing to seek
custody and visitation. 289
In light of the enactment of same-sex marriage in New York,
and given the holding of Obergefell, Alison D.’s premise of
heterosexual parenting and nonrecognition of same-sex couples
became unsustainable. 290 However, the fundamental right of a
biological or legal parent mandates caution when expanding the
definition of parent. 291 These fundamental rights of parents must be
balanced against the fundamental liberty interests of children in
preserving the bonds they have created with their family. 292

facts establish[ed]’ that petitioner was ‘a parent’ to the child, and as such, ‘chargeable with the
support of the child.’” Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 492. Petitioner then amended her visitation
petition to show that she had been found to be the parent and was also a legal parent when it
came to her visitation rights. Id.
285 Id. The Family Court denied the motion to dismiss. Id. It opined that, while petitioner
did not have standing under Alison D. nor Debra H., given respondent’s successful support
petition, equitable estoppel applied in this case. Id.
286 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 493.
287 Id. at 494.
288 Id. at 498 (quoting Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 659 (Kaye, J., dissenting)).
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 499.
292 Id.
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The Court struggled with devising a test when considering who
has standing as a parent under DRL § 70. 293 It held that because of the
fundamental rights afforded to biological and legal parents, any test
that seeks to expand the definition of parent must be appropriately
narrow. 294 Petitioners and some amici encouraged the Court to endorse
a functional test for standing, which considers many factors, most
relating to the post-birth relationship between the non-biological, nonadoptive parent and the child. 295 Others proposed a “test that hinges
on whether petitioner can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
a couple ‘jointly planned and explicitly agreed to the conception of a
child with the intention of raising the child as co-parents.’” 296
The Court, however, rejected the premise that it must decide a
test that would be appropriate for all situations, but rather finds that
because the two cases involve couples that have entered a preconception agreement, that agreement is enough to establish
standing. 297 As such, while Brooke expressly overruled Alison D.,
making significant progress in the field of same-sex couples by giving
them standing to seek custody and visitation, it fell short of securing
them such standing in all situations.298 Without a pre-conception
agreement, the Court is silent on whether a non-biological, nonadoptive parent would have standing under the “broadened” definition
of parent under DRL § 70. 299
V.

ANALYSIS

Under the psychological parent doctrine, the person seeking
custody or visitation must not be the legal parent, must have resided
with the child for a specified amount of time, and must have routinely
performed a certain share of caretaking functions. 300 If this was the
test used in Brooke, both petitioners would have been awarded
standing. 301 Both petitioners were not the legal parents, both lived with
293

Id. at 500.
Id.
295 Id.
296 Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 500.
297 Id. All parties entered into a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise their child
as co-parents. Id.
298 Id. at 501.
299 Id.
300 See discussion supra Section IV.
301 See generally Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488.
294
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the respondent and child for a significant period of time allowing for a
close parent-child bond to be formed, and both shared major parenting
responsibilities. 302 Basing the relationship on the day-to-day
interaction, companionship and shared experiences of the adult and
child helps to ensure third-parties that are too far removed do not
infringe on the biological or legal parents fundamental rights. 303 Under
this concept, a same-sex former partner would have standing to seek
custody and visitation only if there was a significant tie to the child and
if the above requirements had been met.
The concept of a de facto parent allows for a non-legal, nonbiological parent to have standing to seek custody and visitation. 304 It
requires the person to have lived with the child for at least two years,
or since birth if the child is not yet two, and have regularly performed
caretaking functions for the child. 305 In the consolidated case of
Brooke, both petitioners would again meet the criteria required to have
standing. 306 Both women lived with the child for at least two years or
since birth and regularly performed caretaking functions, which began
with prenatal doctor visits. 307 This concept would again prevent farremoved third parties from seeking custody and visitation while
infringing on the fundamental rights of biological or legal parents. 308
The final principle that could establish standing for custody and
visitation is parent by estoppel. 309 Typically utilized in paternity cases,
this concept could also be used for same-sex parents seeking custody
and visitation. 310 The parent by estoppel doctrine states that a person
who is obligated to pay child support or a person who has lived with
the child for two years, while having a reasonable, good-faith that he
or she is the biological parent, or held the child out to be his or her own
is considered to have standing when seeking custody or visitation.311
Again, in the case of Brooke, both petitioners would have satisfied the
doctrine of parent by estoppel. 312 Both lived with the child since birth,
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312

Id. at 490-93.
Goldstein et.al, supra note 140, at 19.
See discussion supra Section IV.
See discussion supra Section IV.
See generally Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488.
Id. at 490-93.
See discussion supra Section IV.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 186, at 107-08.
See discussion supra Section IV.
See discussion supra Section IV.
See generally Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488.
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held out and accepted the child as their own, and accepted full and
permanent responsibilities as parents. 313
VI.

CONCLUSION

In refusing to establish a bright-line test when considering
standing in a custody and visitation petition put forth by a same-sex
former partner, the Court has left the nonbiological and non-legal
parents of New York in a state of confusion and without an easy to
navigate roadmap. 314 The holding of Brooke did, however, allow a
small group of nonbiological, non-legal parents to have standing to
seek custody and/or visitation––those with a pre-conception
agreement. 315 It is the position of this Note that the Court of Appeals
of New York should expand the legal definition of a parent when the
Court meets a “legal stranger” who is not a legal or biological parent,
but meets the definitions set forth in the ALI Principles of
psychological parent, de facto parent, and parent by estoppel.316
Respectively, the courts should recognize the bond fused between the
would-be parent and child, and allow the would-be parent to have
standing to seek custody and/or visitation.
The three proposed doctrines of psychological parent, de facto
parent, and parent by estoppel offer an established way for the courts
to decide who has standing with regard to custody and visitation. 317 In
providing a clear, well-established test, the Court of Appeals could
have prevented what is sure to be an onslaught of cases where there is
no pre-conception agreement between same-sex partners. Having this
unanswered question will likely to lead to differing standards and a
lack of consensus among lower New York courts. As such, the stability
and permanence that is fundamental to a child’s development will be
in jeopardy until the Court adopts a broader test to establish
standing. 318

313

Id. 490-93.
Id. at 501.
315 Id.
316 See generally discussion supra Section IV.
317 See discussion supra Section IV.
318 See Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488; Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27. Compare the holding in
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d at 490, with Justice Kaye’s dissent in Alison D, 572 N.E.2d. at 30-33.
314
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